China and Brazil: Economic impacts of a growing relationship by Jenkins, Rhys
Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 
China aktuell 
 
 
 
Jenkins, Rhys (2012), 
China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship, in: Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 21-47. 
ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) 
 
The online version of this article and the other articles can be found at: 
<www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
Published by 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies  
in cooperation with the National Institute of Chinese Studies, White Rose East Asia 
Centre at the Universities of Leeds and Sheffield and Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes: 
● ●Africa Spectrum  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs  Journal of Current Southeast 
● ●Asian Affairs  Journal of Politics in Latin America  <www.giga-journal-family.org> 
 
 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012:  21-47  
 
China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a 
Growing Relationship 
Rhys JENKINS 
Abstract: The paper analyses the economic impacts of China’s re-
emergence on Brazil, looking at both the direct effects of China on Bra-
zil in terms of bilateral trade and investment flows and the indirect ef-
fects through increased competition in export markets for manufactured 
goods and higher world prices for primary commodities. Despite a surge 
in Chinese FDI in Brazil in 2010, the main driver of bilateral relations is 
trade. While bilateral trade has grown rapidly, the pattern that has 
emerged has given rise to concern because Brazil’s exports are concen-
trated in a small number of primary products while imports from China 
are almost entirely of manufactured goods that are becoming more tech-
nologically sophisticated over time. Brazil has benefitted in the short 
term from the high prices of primary commodities (partly caused by 
growing Chinese demand), but has lost export markets to China in manu- 
factures, contributing to the “primarization” of the country’s export 
basket.  
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Introduction 
China’s rapid growth and increased openness over the past three decades 
has led to its emergence as a key player in the global economy in the 
early twenty-first century. GDP has grown at over 9 per cent per annum 
over 30 years and China is now the second-largest economy in the world. 
It has also increased its share of world trade significantly, overtaking 
Germany to become the world’s largest exporter. This has had major 
implications for Latin American economies, of which Brazil is the most 
significant. The aim of this paper1 is to analyse the impacts of China on 
the Brazilian economy in recent years.  
Brazil established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
China in 1974 under the military government but links remained relative-
ly limited until the 1990s. In 1993 China recognized Brazil as a “Strategic 
Partner”, the first Latin American country to receive this designation. 
Even before the take-off of trade between the two countries since the 
start of the millennium, significant cooperation was established in tech-
nical and scientific areas, most notably the joint efforts to develop re-
mote sensing satellites (De Oliveira 2010). 
In 2010 China was Brazil’s largest trading partner, accounting for 
over 15 per cent of total Brazilian exports and supplying over 14 per cent 
of its imports. Brazil has become a major supplier of iron ore and soy-
beans to the Chinese market, and exports to China increased almost 
thirty-fold between 2000 and 2010. Although on nothing like the scale of 
trade, investment flows between Brazil and China are also increasing. 
The relationship with China has been a source of considerable con-
troversy in Brazil (Barbosa and Mendes 2006). The Lula administration 
was keen to develop a strong partnership with China, and the president 
visited China in 2004 and again in 2009 with a large delegation of minis-
ters, governors and businesspeople; his successor Dilma Rousseff con-
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Workshop on China and 
Latin America” at the University of Leeds, 11 May 2011. It is based partly on a re-
search project (“The Impact of China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin 
America”) financed by the ESRC’s World Economy and Finance Research Pro-
gramme. It also draws on preliminary data from a project carried out with Alexan-
dre de Freitas Barbosa of the University of São Paulo entitled “Brazilian Manufac-
turing in the Face of Chinese Competition: Economic Restructuring, Competitive-
ness and Employment”, funded by the ESRC Pathfinder research projects, Grant 
No. RES-238-25-0006. I am grateful to the editors and two anonymous referees for 
their comments. 
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tinued this tradition, visiting China during her first hundred days in of-
fice. However, the business community has been sharply divided: Firms 
with interests in China, particularly through exports, formed the Con-
selho Empresarial Brasil–China (CEBC) in 2004 with the aim of enhanc-
ing Brazilian–Chinese economic relations. On the other hand, the Feder-
acão das Indûstrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP) and a number of 
sectoral associations representing industries affected by Chinese compe-
tition have called for increased government support and for the imple-
mentation of safeguarding measures against China (Paraguassu 2007). 
These conflicting views illustrate the complex and contradictory nature 
of the impact that the global expansion of China is having on the Brazili-
an economy. 
A Framework for Analysing the Impacts of China 
In order to make sense of this complexity, a framework has been devel-
oped to analyse the impacts of China’s growth on other developing 
countries (Shafaeddin 2004; Jenkins and Edwards 2006; Schmitz 2006; 
Kaplinsky and Messner 2008). This can be presented as a matrix: 
 
 Complementary effects Competitive effects 
Direct effects   
Indirect effects   
 
It is important to recognize that because China is such a large country, 
its growth has an impact on the global economy, so China’s economic 
impact on Brazil cannot be analysed solely by looking at bilateral eco-
nomic relations. It is therefore useful to distinguish between the direct 
effects of China on Brazil – which are the result of trade and investment 
flows between the two countries – and the indirect effects. As is increas-
ingly being recognized, what happens in the Chinese economy has a 
major impact on the world, whether in terms of global growth, interna-
tional finance or global commodity prices. These can then impact Brazil 
in ways that go beyond the effects of bilateral economic relations. In-
deed, it is quite possible that such indirect effects are of greater signifi-
cance for some economies than are direct effects. 
In addition to separating the direct from the indirect effects of Chi-
na on Brazil, the matrix also distinguishes between those impacts that 
involve a complementary relationship between China and Brazil and 
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those where Brazil and China are in competition with each other. The 
former involve “win-win” situations where both countries gain from the 
growth of China (Jiang 2009; Wu n.d.; Dos Santos and Zignago 2010). 
The latter give rise to fears that Brazil is losing out to China in global and 
domestic markets (Baumann 2009; FIESP 2007; FIESP n.d.). These two 
dimensions are also commonly expressed as “opportunities” and 
“threats” or “challenges” in the literature on China and Latin America 
(IDB 2006; Lederman, Olarreaga, and Perry 2009). This framework pro-
vides a basis both for evaluating the overall impact of China on Brazil 
and for understanding the conflicts that arise within Brazil over econom-
ic relations with China. 
Table 1: Economic Impacts of China on Other Developing Countries 
  Complementary effects Competitive effects 
Trade Direct 
effects 
Chinese demand for exports; 
Cheaper inputs and capital goods 
from China; 
Lower prices for consumer 
goods 
Displacement of local 
producers by Chinese 
imports 
Indirect 
effects 
Increased world commodity 
prices 
Competition from 
Chinese goods in third 
markets 
Foreign 
investment 
Direct 
effects 
Chinese FDI bringing in addi-
tional resources (capital, technol-
ogy) 
Displacement of local 
firms by Chinese 
investors 
Indirect 
effects 
Integration into global produc-
tion networks with China 
Diversion of FDI by 
OECD countries from 
Brazil to China 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Kaplinsky and Messner 2008: Figure 6. 
The matrix can be expanded by looking separately at different types of 
global flows. Given that aid and migration are not significant in the rela-
tions between China and Brazil, the key flows are those of trade and 
foreign investment. Table 1 sets out the most important potential im-
pacts that can arise as a result of China’s growth. As the table shows, 
some of the impacts – such as the growth of imports from China – can 
have both positive and negative effects on other countries, affecting 
different groups differently. In other cases, the impacts are clearly either 
positive or negative – for example, a loss of export markets to China (an 
indirect/ competitive effect) has a negative effect on Brazil. 
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This article uses this framework to evaluate the recent effects of 
China on Brazil, identifying the most important channels through which 
the impact of Chinese growth has been transmitted. The next section 
focuses on the direct effects of bilateral trade and investment between 
Brazil and China. The following section then turns to the indirect effects 
that arise from China’s growing role in the global economy. For Brazil, 
the most significant of these indirect effects are 1) competition from 
Chinese manufactured goods in its major markets in the US, Europe and 
the rest of Latin America (a competitive effect) and 2) the increased 
prices for primary products exported by Brazil as a result of the surging 
Chinese demand for raw materials (a complementary effect). There is 
little evidence of an indirect effect in terms of foreign investment, so this 
is not addressed in the paper. Finally, the last section of the paper at-
tempts a preliminary analysis of the impact of China on the growth and 
structure of the Brazilian economy. 
Direct Impacts 
Bilateral Trade between Brazil and China 
As already noted, trade between Brazil and China has expanded signifi-
cantly in recent years. Figure 1 shows that Brazilian exports to China 
grew rapidly from 1999 on, following a slight decline in the 1990s. Chi-
na’s share of all Brazilian exports increased dramatically from approxi-
mately 2 per cent in the late 1990s to over 15 per cent in 2010, making it 
Brazil’s most important export market (Aliceweb/MDIC). One explana-
tion of this rapid growth of exports is that resource constraints really 
began to be felt in China at the end of the 1990s. This view is supported 
by the sharp increase since the late 1990s in China’s net trade deficit in a 
number of primary commodities that Brazil exports, such as iron ore and 
soybeans (UNCTAD 2005: Fig. 2.8). Furthermore, the accession of Chi-
na to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the ensuing 
trade liberalization could have given an additional boost to exports. 
The spectacular growth of imports from China started somewhat 
later than that of exports (see Figure 1), but since 2002 the former have 
grown sixteen-fold, China’s share of Brazilian imports having increased 
from approximately 2 per cent at the start of the millennium to over 14 
per cent in 2010 (Aliceweb/MDIC). China’s access to the Brazilian mar-
ket was improved after the former’s 2001 accession to the WTO.  
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Figure 1: Brazilian Trade with China, 1996–2010 (in million USD) 
Source: Aliceweb/MDIC.
The Structure of Brazilian Exports to China 
Although Brazilian exports have grown rapidly, concerns have been 
expressed over both the composition of these exports – the so-called 
primarization of Brazilian exports – and their concentration in a relative-
ly small number of products and exporters. In terms of structure, ex-
ports to China are predominantly of primary products and resource-
based manufactures with relatively limited value added. Table 2 shows 
that in 1996 and 2001 these accounted for approximately 70 per cent of 
exports and that there was a shift in the composition of exports to China 
from resource-based manufactures to unprocessed primary commodities. 
Since the period of rapid export growth began in 2001, both primary 
commodities and resource-based manufactures have increased their 
shares: By 2006 over 80 per cent of total exports fell into these two cate-
gories, and by 2009 this had increased to almost 90 per cent. 
Table 2 also shows that the composition of Brazil’s exports to China 
is very different from that of its exports to the rest of the world. In 2009 
primary commodities and resource-based manufactures accounted for 
just over 60 per cent of Brazilian exports to countries other than China, 
compared to almost 90 per cent to China. Conversely, the share of non–
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resource-based manufactures is much higher in Brazil’s exports to the 
rest of the world. 
Table 2: Composition of Brazilian Exports to China (in %) 
 Exports to China 
Rest of the 
World 
 1996 2001 2006 2009 2009 
Primary commodities 26.2 36.6 42.9 42.8 31.6 
Resource-based manufactures 44.5 35.7 39.7 45.3 28.6 
Low technology  14.1 8.9 8.1 1.7 7.5 
Medium technology 13.8 12.1 7.2 7.8 20.8 
High technology 1.5 6.7 1.9 2.4 7.6 
Note: Exports classified according to the categories used in Lall 2000. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on UN COMTRADE data. 
Exports to China are concentrated in a very limited number of products, 
with iron ore and soybeans accounting for two-thirds of the total in 
2009. Other major products currently exported include crude petroleum, 
leather and wood pulp. Exports to China are much more concentrated 
than exports to Brazil’s other major markets: Whereas 95 per cent of 
Brazil’s non-agricultural exports to China in 2008 were accounted for by 
20 Harmonized System 6-digit products, the corresponding number of 
products required to make up this proportion of Brazilian exports to the 
US was over 350, to the European Union over 500, and to Argentina 
over 600 (WTO 2009). 
Why is it that Brazil’s exports to China are concentrated in such a 
narrow range of products? One possible explanation is that Brazil is a 
resource-abundant country and that the only products in which it has a 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis China are a few primary commodities 
and resource-based manufactures. However, there are a number of such 
products in which Brazil has a strong comparative advantage in world 
markets but that it has not been exporting to China on a significant scale.  
Machado and Ferraz (2006), in a detailed study of the impact of 
China’s trade on Brazilian exports, identified 58 products at the 6-digit 
level of the Harmonized System classification in which Brazil had a 
comparative advantage in its trade with the rest of the world but which 
were not exported to China in 2001–02 (nor were they exported by Chi-
na). They also identified a further 46 products which were exported from 
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Brazil to China, but which lost market share in China between 1996–97 
and 2001–02. The most significant groups of products that were either 
not exported to China or losing market share were meat products; fruits 
and nuts; soya cake and oil; and iron and steel. The authors carried out a 
survey of firms producing these products in order to ascertain the rea-
sons they either were not exporting to China or were losing market 
share. In the case of meat, the main reason was sanitary barriers, fol-
lowed by import quotas (Machado and Ferraz 2006: Table 36). For fruits 
and vegetables, the main problems were related to transport and variable 
supply (Machado and Ferraz 2006: Table 38). In the vegetable oil sector, 
soybean cake is not exported to China and soybean oil has lost market 
share. Firms attributed this increased domestic competition to the im-
port-substituting policies in China. A similar process has occurred in the 
case of iron and steel (for further details see below). 
In 2008 a joint report by the Brazilian government and the private 
sector identified over 600 products (including both primary products and 
manufactured goods) that had the potential to be exported to China 
(Governo Federal 2008). But again, tariff and non-tariff barriers were 
identified as important problems faced by Brazilian exporters to China. 
Since, as shown above, Brazil exports a number of manufactured 
goods to markets other than China, the question is also raised of why the 
pattern of exports to China is so skewed toward products with a very 
low level of processing. This is at least in part due to the protectionist 
policies implemented by the Chinese government to promote its domes-
tic production. This is well illustrated by several of the major value 
chains in which Brazil has significant exports to China. 
Take the case of the soybean value chain: Brazil’s exports are heavily 
concentrated in unprocessed beans, which accounted for over 94 per 
cent of total exports in 2009. In contrast, there are virtually no exports of 
soybean meal and flour to China, and a relatively small proportion of the 
chain’s exports is made up of soybean oil (UN COMTRADE). China 
pursued a deliberate strategy to promote the Chinese crushing industry. 
For five years after its accession to the WTO, China applied a system of 
tariff quotas to imports of soybean oil. Imports within the quota paid a 
tariff of 9 per cent, but extra quota imports were taxed at a much higher 
rate. Although the differential was reduced over time and the quota end-
ed in 2006, the tariff on oil imports of 9 per cent was three times that on 
imports of soybean (3 per cent). More processed imported soybean 
products also pay a higher value-added tax rate than unprocessed beans 
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(for more details on the protection of the Chinese soybean oil industry, 
see Lopez, Ramos, and Starobinsky 2010). As a result, while Brazilian 
exports of unprocessed soybeans increased by seven and a half times 
between 2002 and 2009, soya oil exports stagnated between 2002 and 
2006 and increased only three-fold over the entire period. Brazilian 
shipments of soybeans to China have also faced problems at times, hav-
ing been blocked by the Chinese authorities on several occasions for 
alleged phytosanitary violations (Jales et al. 2004). 
The pattern of escalating tariffs, with higher rates levied on more 
processed products, is also characteristic of other value chains that ex-
port from Brazil to China (WTO data on applied MFN tariffs for China 
in 2005). In the case of leather, for example, the tariff on bovine leather 
averages approximately 6 per cent, whereas leather products such as 
suitcases, handbags and wallets are subject to tariffs of between 10 and 
20 per cent. Similarly in iron and steel, whereas iron ore and concentrates 
are imported duty-free, semi-finished products pay a duty of 2 per cent, 
flat rolled products 5 or 6 per cent, steel wire 8 per cent, nails and screws 
10 per cent and steel cans 17.5 per cent. In the case of pulp and paper, 
another major value chain exporting from Brazil to China, wood pulp is 
imported duty-free, whereas paper and paperboard are subject to tariffs 
of between 5 and 7.5 per cent. In all these value chains, Brazilian exports 
to China are concentrated in the products with the lowest degree of pro-
cessing. For example, over 85 per cent of exports of iron and steel are of 
iron ore and concentrates, while in leather over 99 per cent of exports 
are of leather and less than 1 per cent of leather products (author’s own 
estimation from UN COMTRADE data for 2009). 
Brazilian Imports from China 
Not surprisingly, Brazilian imports from China show a completely differ-
ent structure than its exports to China. Table 3 shows that primary 
commodities have generally accounted for less than 5 per cent of total 
imports, and that in 2009, primary commodities and resource-based 
manufactures – which make up the bulk of Brazil’s exports to China – 
accounted together for just over 12 per cent of its imports from that 
country. 
While non–resource-based manufactures have accounted for the 
bulk of imports from China throughout the period, there have been 
significant changes in the technology level of such imports. The share of 
low technology products fell from almost 40 per cent of imports from 
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China in 1996 to just over 20 per cent in 2009, while the share of high 
technology products increased from 25 per cent to over 40 per cent over 
the same period. This suggests that the range of products in which China 
competes in the Brazilian market is increasing over time and is not con-
fined to those traditional labour-intensive products sometimes thought 
to be its area of comparative advantage. While in some cases it may be 
the less technologically sophisticated processes involved in manufactur-
ing high tech products that are located in China, there is nevertheless 
considerable evidence that Chinese production is moving up the techno-
logical ladder. 
Table 3: Composition of Brazilian Imports from China (in %) 
 1996 2001 2006 2009 
Primary commodities 3.4 4.3 1.4 1.6 
Resource-based manufactures 10.9 17.0 9.5 10.7 
Low technology  39.6 20.6 16.1 20.8 
Medium technology 20.2 19.2 26.2 25.2 
High technology 25.0 38.4 46.5 41.4 
Note: Exports classified according to the categories used in Lall 2000. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on UN COMTRADE data. 
Another way to look at the composition of Brazilian imports from China 
is in terms of end use – that is, whether they are intermediate goods, 
capital goods or final consumer goods. The popular perception of Chi-
nese products is often of cheap consumer goods, but Table 4 shows that 
this is not in fact the case. 
In 2006 and 2009, over half of Brazil’s imports from China were 
classified as capital goods and their parts and accessories, and approxi-
mately one quarter of the imports were classified as industrial supplies. 
Consumer goods made up only some 15 to 17 per cent of total imports. 
This is a very marked change from the situation in the mid-1990s when 
consumer goods accounted for over 40 per cent of total imports from 
China, and capital goods and parts for less than one quarter of the total. 
This trend is consistent with the increased technological level of Chinese 
exports and suggests that – rather than being a competitive threat in the 
market for final consumer goods – imports from China may be a source 
of increased profits for Brazilian producers through providing access to 
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cheaper equipment, intermediate inputs, and parts and components. This 
question needs to be researched further. 
Table 4: Brazilian Imports from China by End Use (in %) 
 1996 2001 2006 2009 
Food & beverages 3.3 0.9 0.7 1.0 
Industrial supplies 22.3 26.2 23.6 26.5 
Fuels & lubricants 3.6 9.2 1.7 0.6 
Capital goods 12.3 18.1 26.2 24.9 
Parts for capital goods 11.9 23.4 28.3 25.3 
Transport equipment 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.8 
Parts for transport equipment 2.6 2.2 4.6 4.4 
Consumption goods 43.6 19.8 14.8 16.5 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from UN COMTRADE data. 
One of the main concerns over Chinese exports to Brazil is the extent to 
which they are displacing domestic producers of industrial goods. Figure 
2 shows that the overall level of import penetration of the Brazilian mar-
ket for manufactured goods increased in the late 1990s as a result of 
trade liberalization and an overvalued exchange rate. During this period, 
imports from China remained relatively low. However since 2001, the 
share of Chinese imports has increased while import penetration from 
the rest of the world has declined somewhat. This has led to increasingly 
vociferous complaints from industrialists about competition from Chi-
nese imports (Marin 2005). 
Although the aggregate level of Chinese import penetration was rela- 
tively low (at only 3.3 per cent of total consumption of industrial prod-
ucts in Brazil in 2007), some industries have been affected much more 
than others. Imports from China accounted for over 15 per cent of total 
consumption of medical instruments, travel goods, batteries and accu-
mulators, and lamps and lighting. The level of penetration was over 10 
per cent in a number of other sectors including data-processing equip-
ment, radios, TVs and recording equipment, telephone equipment, and 
basic electronic materials (Jenkins and Barbosa 2011: Table 2). These 
figures may well underestimate the extent of Chinese competition since 
they only go up to 2007, and imports have increased further since then. 
They also take into account only those Chinese goods that are legally 
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imported. The Brazilian textile and clothing industry association, how-
ever, has estimated that it lost 60 million USD in sales to smuggled Chi-
nese goods in 2006 (Paraguassu 2007). 
Figure 2: Import Penetration* in Manufacturing Goods from World and China, 
1996–2007 
Note: * Imports divided by gross value of industrial production + imports – exports. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from MDIC/Aliceweb and Pesquisa Industrial Annual 
data. 
Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Flows 
Chinese Investment in Brazil 
Before 2010, Chinese FDI in Brazil was very limited. Although outward 
investment from China increased rapidly in the late 2000s to become the 
fifth-largest source of FDI in the world in 2009, Brazil remained largely 
unaffected. However in 2010 the situation changed with significant new 
Chinese investment in the country. 
Table 5 shows the relatively insignificant level of Chinese FDI flows 
to Brazil (although it began to grow in 2009). Chinese official data on 
investment in Brazil differ slightly from those reported by the Brazilian 
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Central Bank on inflows of Chinese FDI. Nevertheless, they show that a 
little over 0.1 per cent of Chinese FDI over the period 2003–09 went to 
Brazil; looking at it from the Brazilian side, less than 0.1 per cent of total 
inflows of FDI came from China.  
Table 5: Chinese FDI Flows to Brazil, 2002–2010 
 Outward FDI from China (1) Inward FDI to Brazil (2) 
 
To Brazil (in 
million USD) 
% of Total 
Chinese FDI 
From China 
(in million 
USD) 
% of Total 
FDI to Brazil 
2002 Not available Not available 9.7 0.05 
2003 6.7 0.23 15.5 0.12 
2004 6.4 0.12 4.4 0.02 
2005 15.1 0.12 7.6 0.04 
2006 10.1 0.06 6.7 0.03 
2007 51.1 0.19 24.3 0.07 
2008 22.4 0.04 38.4 0.09 
2009 116.3 0.21 82 0.27 
2010 Not available Not available 392 0.75 
2002–2009* 228.1 0.13 188.6 0.09 
Note: 2003–2009 for outward FDI from China. 
Sources: (1) MOFCOM 2009: Table 1; (2) IPEA 2011: Table 1. 
Some caution is required, however, since there is a tendency to underes-
timate Chinese FDI, particularly because so much of it goes via third 
countries – especially Hong Kong and tax havens such as the Cayman 
Islands and the British Virgin Islands – and therefore does not show up 
as investment in Brazil in the Chinese data or as investment from China 
on the Brazilian side. Also, since MOFCOM data is based on trusting 
that firms will 1) register overseas investments and 2) report reinvested 
earnings overseas, there is further underestimation (Rosen and Hane-
mann 2009). 
Nevertheless, other sources also indicate limited investment from 
China in the period up to 2009. The much-quoted joint venture between 
Vale and Baosteel never got off the ground, and other investments by 
Chinese firms in this period were on a relatively small scale (Saslavsky 
and Rozemberg 2009: 212-220). 
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Although Table 5 shows a sharp increase in Chinese FDI in 2010, 
other sources indicate that the figure of almost 400 million USD is a 
fraction of the real investment from China in that year. The Brazilian 
government think tank IPEA estimates Chinese acquisitions in Brazil in 
2010 of over 14.9 billion USD of which over 10.6 billion had been com-
pleted and the remainder were awaiting government approval (IPEA 
2011: Table 2). The Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean reports confirmed Chinese FDI in Brazil of over 9.5 billion 
USD in 2010 (CEPAL 2011: Table III.3), while the Brazil–China Busi-
ness Council puts the figure at nearly 12.7 billion USD, of which over 
11.1 billion were acquisitions from other foreign investors (CEBC 2011: 
13). The acquisition of a 40 per cent share of Repsol YPF by Sinopec 
alone represented an investment of over 7.1 billion USD, dwarfing the 
official figure for Chinese FDI in Brazil. Reports of planned investment 
by Chinese firms in Brazil in 2011 suggest that they will again come to 
more than 10 billion USD. 
Most of the recent surge in Chinese investment in Brazil has been 
through mergers and acquisitions. Of the total confirmed investment 
recorded by CEBC in 2010, only 6 per cent were greenfield investments, 
and the rest involved M&A (own calculation from CEBC 2011: Appen-
dix 2). As already noted, many of these involved acquisitions from other 
foreign investors and therefore did not contribute to an increase in capi-
tal inflows to Brazil but simply meant a change in the origin of the for-
eign owners. 
The main sectors for Chinese investment in Brazil have been mining 
and oil and gas, with some planned investments in agribusiness. These 
are all clearly resource-seeking and reflect the trading relations between 
the two countries, particularly the concentration of Brazilian exports on 
primary commodities. There have been some market-seeking invest-
ments, most notably the acquisition of several electricity companies by 
State Grid. There are also Chinese investments in manufacturing to serve 
the domestic market, including in air conditioners, motorcycles and con-
struction machinery (CEPAL 2011: 177-179), and a proposed investment 
to produce sub-compact cars by Chery (CEBC 2011: Ch. 4). These are 
mainly assembly operations that rely on imported parts and components 
from China and can therefore be seen as an extension of China’s export 
strategy to Brazil. 
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Brazilian Investment in China 
Although Brazilian FDI in China has been relatively limited, as shown in 
Table 6, the official figures show that until quite recently, Brazilian FDI 
flows to China exceeded those coming from China (cf. Table 5). Never-
theless, Brazil accounted for less than 0.1 per cent of total FDI inflows 
to China, and a similarly low proportion of Brazil’s total FDI went to 
China over the same period. 
Table 6: Brazilian FDI in China, 2002–2009 
 Inward FDI to China (1) Outward FDI from Brazil (2) 
 From Brazil 
(in million 
USD) 
% of Total 
FDI to China 
To China (in 
million USD) 
% of Total 
Brazilian FDI  
2002 15.36 0.03 13 0.03 
2003 16.71 0.03 15 0.03 
2004 30.7 0.05 28 0.05 
2005 24.61 0.04 76 0.12 
2006 55.6 0.09 93 0.10 
2007 31.64 0.04 83 0.07 
2008 38.79 0.04 48 0.04 
2009 52.48 0.06 138 0.10 
2002–2009 265.89 0.07 494 0.07 
Source: (1) China Statistical Yearbook, various issues; (2) Banco Central do Brasil. 
Despite the rapidly growing trade between Brazil and China, this has not 
been reflected in significant increases in Brazilian investment in China. 
There are a few high-profile cases of Brazilian firms that have established 
plants in China, most notably the aircraft manufacturer Embraer (see 
Goldstein and Toulan 2007 and Pimentel 2009 for a history of Em-
braer’s investment in China). Other Brazilian investors include WEG 
(electric motors) and Embraco (compressors). A number of other large 
Brazilian firms have been interested in investing in China but have faced 
obstacles in doing so as a result of Chinese restrictions and requirements 
(IPEA 2011: 11-12). The main motivation of Brazilian firms investing in 
China has been to gain access to the large and growing domestic market 
rather than to produce for export as many Northern transnational com-
panies have done (Pimentel 2009). 
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Even with the major expansion of Chinese investment in Brazil in 
2010, trade continues to be far more important than FDI in economic 
relations between the two countries. Bilateral trade flows were four or 
five times greater than FDI flows in 2010, and FDI was mainly driven by 
trade, with investments forming part of a strategy of ensuring supplies of 
raw materials from Brazil or securing better access to the Brazilian mar-
ket for Chinese exports of manufactures. 
Indirect Impacts 
Unlike earlier East Asian industrializers such as South Korea and Tai-
wan, which were relatively small economies, China’s size means that its 
rapid growth is having a major impact on the global economy, which in 
turn affects other developing countries. In the case of Brazil, two such 
indirect effects are particularly significant: first, their impact on Brazilian 
manufactured exports that compete with China in third markets, and 
second, the effects of increased Chinese demand on world prices of 
primary commodities that Brazil exports. 
Chinese Competition and Brazilian Exports 
Brazil is often presented as a country that has benefitted from the 
growth of China in contrast to some other countries – most notably 
Mexico – that have suffered because they compete with China in third 
markets and have lost market share as a result of China’s global expan-
sion. Although Brazil’s exports to China are overwhelmingly of natural 
resource-based products, as was shown in Table 2, more than one-third 
of its exports to the rest of the world are made up of non–resource-
based manufactures, and as such could face increased competition. This 
section will therefore consider the extent to which Brazil has lost market 
share to China in its major export markets. 
The methodology used to estimate the loss of market share to China 
is an extension of Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis developed by 
Batista (2008). The gains (losses) of market shares between countries are 
related to their relative growth rates. In other words, countries gain from 
those countries whose exports are growing more slowly and lose to those 
that are growing faster than their own.  
The loss of market share by a country (H) to China (C), in a particu-
lar product i is defined as: 
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kHci = kHi*ktCi -  kCi* ktHi  (1) 
where: kHi is the share of country H in total imports of good i by the 
destination market; 
 kCi is the share of China in total imports of good i by the desti-
nation market;  
superscript t represents the initial year of the period. 
Summing over all products gives the aggregate loss of market share 
to China: 
kHci = kHi*ktCi -  kCi* ktHi   (2) 
Although this provides a useful way of attributing losses of market share 
between countries, it should be noted that the decomposition is based on 
accounting identities, and one should therefore be careful in making any 
causal inferences from it. 
Equation (2) was used to estimate the loss of market share by Brazil 
to China. The data was collected for four key years, 1996, 2001, 2004 and 
2009, in order to distinguish three time periods. The period from 1996 to 
2001 represents the situation before China became a member of the 
WTO. The period from 2001 to 2004 covers the transition period be-
tween China’s accession to the WTO and the final removal of quotas on 
textiles and garments on 1 January 2005, although it should be noted that 
subsequently the US and the EU imposed new restrictions on Chinese 
textile and clothing imports. The period from 2004 to 2009 shows the 
effects of full integration of China into the global economy. 
The analysis presented here focuses on the US and the EU since 
these have been the most significant Northern markets in which Brazil 
faces competition from China. Evidence is also now emerging that Bra-
zilian exports to other Latin American countries are being affected by 
Chinese competition (Jenkins and Barbosa 2011: 7) but this will not be 
discussed here. The data on US imports comes from the US Internation-
al Trade Commission (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/), and that on the Eu-
ropean Union from the COMEXT database (http://fd.comext.eurostat. 
cec.eu.int/xtweb/). Product data at the 5-digit level of the SITC (Revi-
sion 3) was used. It was important to have a high level of disaggregation 
in order to ensure that the products being compared were close substi-
tutes for each other.  
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Table 7: Brazil’s Loss of Exports to China in the US and EU Markets,  
1996–2009 (%) 
 US EU 
 Total Manufacturing Total Manufacturing 
1996–2001 -0.5 -0.7 0 -2.5 
2001–2004 -6.1 -9.6 -0.1 -0.3 
2004–2009 -3.1 -5.3 -2.1 -5.9 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on USITC and COMEXT data. 
The estimates in Table 7 show that the impact of Chinese competition 
on Brazilian exports to third markets has been significant. Exports to the 
US have been worse hit by competition from China than have exports to 
the EU. In the latter case, it is only since 2004 that Brazil has lost market 
share to China. In the US, on the other hand, Brazil has been losing 
export markets to China since China joined the WTO in 2001. Not sur-
prisingly, the impact has been felt most strongly in the case of exports of 
manufactures to both markets, reflecting the fact that China competes 
mainly in manufactured goods. 
Impacts on the Terms of Trade 
A second important indirect effect of China’s growth on Brazil is via the 
terms of trade and particularly the prices of primary commodities. Be-
cause China is not a “small economy” in economic terms, its growth 
affects world prices, so Brazil benefits not only from the growth of its 
exports to China but also from higher world prices for its exports to the 
rest of the world. Indeed, Brazil may benefit from higher prices for 
products it does not currently export to China, but China imports from 
other countries and that Brazil exports to the rest of the world. 
Table 8 shows the 15 major primary commodities exported from 
Latin America and the estimated impact of the rapid growth of demand 
from China on world prices in recent years. The first two columns of 
figures show a range of estimates of the impact of China’s rapid eco-
nomic growth on prices based on different assumptions about the elas-
ticity of the world supply of the various commodities drawn from a 
number of different sources. This involved calculating the relative rates 
of growth of demand for each commodity in China and in the rest of the 
world between 2002 and 2007 and then estimating how much lower 
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world demand would have been if Chinese demand had grown at the 
same rate as demand in the rest of the world over the period (for details 
of the sources used and how the impact of China on world prices was 
calculated, see Jenkins 2011). The third column shows the value of Bra-
zilian exports of each of the 15 commodities in 2007. The last two col-
umns show the increased value of Brazilian exports of each product as a 
result of the higher prices estimated to have been caused by the rapid 
growth of Chinese demand since 2002. 
It is generally recognized that the impact of China’s growth on 
commodity prices has been most significant for metals in recent years. 
The combination of large increases in Chinese net imports and inelastic 
supply have led to substantial price increases for most metals with the 
IMF metals price index increasing more than three-fold between 2002 
and 2007 (IMF 2011). The main exception has been aluminium, where 
Chinese supply has kept up with the growth in demand and China re-
mains a net exporter. Oil prices have also skyrocketed in recent years, 
but this has had more to do with supply conditions than with the growth 
of demand, and the contribution of China in terms of world oil con-
sumption has not been as significant as in the case of metals. Brazil has 
benefitted particularly from the large increases in the price of iron ore 
between 2002 and 2007. 
Agricultural commodity prices have not increased nearly as rapidly 
as metals and oil prices have. China has become a major importer of 
soybeans, and its demand growth has been an important factor in the 
increased prices in recent years. The growth of demand for meat as food 
consumption patterns change with increased incomes has also meant 
that China has contributed to increased meat prices. However, in anoth-
er significant agricultural product exported by Brazil, coffee, Chinese 
consumption levels are relatively low and demand has not grown very 
rapidly, meaning that China’s impact on prices has been negligible. China 
has had a significant impact on the prices of some forest products ex-
ported from Brazil such as sawn wood and chemical pulp for the paper 
industry. 
Table 8 shows that in 2007 Brazil’s exports of the 15 commodities 
came to almost 56 billion USD, accounting for about one-third of Bra-
zil’s total exports that year. The higher prices resulting from the excep-
tional growth of Chinese demand since 2007 are estimated to have in-
creased Brazilian export earnings by between 9 and 14 billion USD. In 
other words, between 16 and 25 per cent of the total value of exports of 
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these 15 commodities could be accounted for by the “China effect” on 
world prices. The most significant factor in terms of higher export earn-
ings was the increased price of iron ore, but other minerals, crude oil, 
and soybeans and soybean products also contributed.  
Table 8: The “China Effect” on Brazilian Exports of Commodities 
Commodity China’s Impact 
on Prices (%) 
Brazilian Exports 
(in million USD) 
Gain in export earn-
ings (in million USD) 
 
Maxi-
mum 
Mini-
mum 
 
Maxi-
mum 
Mini-
mum 
Crude oil 27.1 10.8 8,905 1,900 871 
Iron ore 153.6 96.0 10,558 6,394 5,171 
Copper  122.6 49.1 2,054 1,131 676 
Aluminium 72.8 45.5 4,396 1,852 1,375 
Zinc  147.6 59.1 164 98 61 
Soybean 7.7 5.1 6,709 477 326 
Soya oil 16.0 10.7 1,720 237 166 
Fishmeal 15.6 10.4 28 4 3 
Coffee 0.5 0.2 3,892 19 8 
Sugar 15.5 3.1 5,101 684 153 
Bananas 3.0 1.5 44 1 1 
Beef 6.6 3.3 3,486 215 111 
Poultry 1.4 0.7 4,360 60 30 
Sawn wood 25.1 8.4 1,567 314 121 
Chemical pulp 11.5 3.8 2,945 303 109 
Total  55,929 13,691 9,181 
Source: Jenkins 2011 and UN COMTRADE data. 
The impact of the “China effect” on Brazil’s trade balance is lower than 
its impact on export earnings because net exports are less than gross 
exports, and for crude oil, copper and zinc Brazil was a net importer in 
2007. A more accurate estimate of the impact on the trade balance can 
therefore be obtained by applying the estimated contribution of China to 
increased prices to the value of net exports rather than of gross exports. 
On this basis, the contribution of the “China effect” was to improve 
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Brazil’s trade balance by between 6.6 and 9 billion USD or between 11.9 
and 16 per cent of the value of exports of the 15 commodities (Jenkins 
2011: Table 5).  
The Impact of China on the Growth and Structure 
of the Brazilian Economy 
Since the Brazilian economy has historically suffered from a foreign 
exchange constraint, a critical factor determining the impact of China on 
economic growth is its effect on the balance of trade and the balance of 
payments. Indeed, it was the large trade surpluses that Brazil enjoyed 
during the first five years of the millennium that were largely responsible 
for the very positive view of the economic impact of China on the coun-
try. 
Figure 3: Brazil’s Trade Balance with China, 1996–2010 (in million USD) 
Source: Aliceweb/MDIC. 
As was noted before, Brazil’s exports to China grew rapidly from the end 
of the 1990s on, while the growth of imports from China started only in 
2002. The differential timing in the growth of exports and imports is 
reflected in Figure 3, which illustrates the evolution of the trade balance 
(4.000)
(3.000)
(2.000)
(1.000)

1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
Deficit/surplus
  42 Rhys Jenkins 
 
between the two countries. Brazil’s trade with China showed small defi-
cits until exports began to grow rapidly at the turn of the century. This 
led to large surpluses, which peaked at almost 2.4 billion USD in 2003. 
After that, the rapid growth of imports from China led to shrinking sur-
pluses that turned into large deficits in 2007 and 2008. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the initial positive view of trade with China was re-
placed by a more sceptical approach in these years. However, the global 
economic crisis, which led to a large drop in Brazilian imports from Chi-
na in 2009 while exports continued to grow, has resulted in large trade 
surpluses for Brazil the past two years. 
However, as the previous section indicated, it is also important to 
take into account the indirect effects China’s growth has had on Brazili-
an trade. The additional net foreign exchange as a result of the contribu-
tion of China to increased world prices since 2002 was estimated at be-
tween 6.6 and 9 billion USD in 2007. On the other hand, the loss of 
markets to China in the United States and the European Union over the 
longer period from 2001 to 2009 came to approximately 2.5 billion USD 
(author’s own estimation from USITC and COMEXT data). A complete 
estimate of the loss would be higher since exports to the US and the EU 
account for only approximately one-third of Brazil’s total exports in 
2009, and there is evidence that the country is also losing market share to 
China in its other major markets in Latin America (Jenkins and Barbosa 
2011). Approximately half of Brazil’s total exports go to markets other 
than the US, EU and China. If Brazil lost market share to China at the 
same rate in these other markets as it has in the US and the EU, then the 
total loss would rise from 2.5 billion to 6.25 billion USD. (Exports to 
other countries, excluding China, are 1.5 times total exports to the US 
and EU, so this ratio was applied to the estimated loss of exports to the 
US and EU.) It may well be that exports to other markets have been less 
affected than those to the US particularly, so this estimate is likely to be 
at the upper end of the possible range. Given that it refers to the loss 
over a longer period (2001–09) than the estimated gain from higher 
commodity prices (2002–07), and that this high-end estimate is some-
what below the lower bound of the estimated gain from the China effect 
on commodity prices, the two indirect effects on Brazilian’s trade bal-
ance are likely to have been positive overall at the end of the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. 
It therefore seems that the effect of China on Brazil’s trade balance, 
taking into account both the direct impacts of bilateral trade flows and 
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the main indirect impacts, is currently positive. This, however, depends 
on the continued high level of Chinese demand for commodities that 
Brazil exports, which is the main factor behind both the direct and indi-
rect positive effects. 
Perhaps more significant in terms of the longer-term growth pro-
spects for Brazil is the impact that China is having on the structure of 
the Brazilian economy. Several studies of the impact of China on Latin 
America have expressed concerns that the growth of China is contrib-
uting to deindustrialization in the region with potentially deleterious 
effects on technological development and long-term growth (IDB 2006; 
Moreira 2007; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010). There is an on-going 
debate amongst Brazilian economists over whether or not the Brazilian 
economy is deindustrializing (Bresser-Pereira 2010; Bonelli and Pessoa 
2010), and the impact of China is often cited as one cause. Although 
given the extent of Chinese import penetration it is an exaggeration to 
claim that it has led to general deindustrialization of the economy, China 
certainly has contributed to the primarization of Brazil’s exports. The 
pattern of trade with China described in the second section shows clear 
evidence of this, with exports being overwhelmingly based on natural 
resources.  
This tends to be reinforced by the indirect impacts of China on Bra-
zil. A higher price for primary commodities tends to encourage invest-
ment in these areas at the expense of the manufacturing sector. Concerns 
have been expressed that the commodity price boom may even be hav-
ing “Dutch disease”-type effects in Latin America (IDB 2006: 212). In 
addition, as was shown above, Chinese competition in Brazil’s export 
markets is also mainly affecting the manufacturing sector. Given the role 
often attributed to manufactured exports in promoting economic 
growth, the difficulties Brazil faces in such markets are another cause for 
concern. 
This also explains the conflicting views of China held by different 
groups in Brazil. Perhaps more than in any other Latin American coun-
try, there are major winners and losers in Brazil as a result of the growth 
of China, both at the sectoral level and in terms of social classes. Primary 
commodity producers have been the major beneficiaries, while the major 
losers have been in the manufacturing sector. The winners consist of a 
fairly small group of producers who account for the bulk of iron ore and 
soybean exports. It seems likely that the losing camp, although concen-
trated in some industrial sectors, consists of far more firms. Further-
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more, if the employment effects of losing markets to China are taken 
into account, the number of losers is likely to be far greater than the 
number of winners. 
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